A logic is a pretentious set of linguistic rules established on the assumption that it is possible to determine valid truth statement sequences from initial truth premise statements. It contrives a set of premises, labels them as true, then constructs a fantastical edifice of abstract engineering which is then exalted as a reliable purified reality. In the real world of chaotic uncertainties, the convenience of finding a set of true premises is never available. The logical structure and presumed certainty of the reasoning process is corrupted by improbabilities and unexpected influences.

Even internally, within its own boundaries, there is cause for scepticism. The rules of logic are postulated to manipulate abstract entities called propositions. These are usually symbolized by single letters like P, Q, R, etc, which are supposed to be the residual purified meanings of statements. Using these propositions as the raw material in the rule sequences, it is further supposed that certain conclusion propositions can be shown to be either true or false and nothing in between. Since most statements ever made about the real world are neither absolutely true, nor absolutely false, but somewhere on the probability spectrum in between, the supposed significance of logic should be viewed with a very healthy dose of suspicion.

For example , the committed logicians linch-pin rule Modus Ponens states that:
If (proposition P implies proposition Q ), and P is true, then Q is true.
Thus: If ( the fish is rotten implies it will smell fishy ) is true,
and the fish is rotten is true, then it will smell fishy will be true.
All of this supposedly valid argumentation relies on establishing the truth of the first implication. Unfortunately, attempting to verify its truth by catching all the fish in the world and then leaving it to become rotten would have quite undesirable consequences. Even if the stupidity of conducting such an exercise was ignored and it was discovered that all fish did smell fishy when left to become rotten, there would be no point in the logical rule. In establishing the truth of the first implication we have already established the truth of the consequent.

The whole logical exercise becomes irrelevant and the symbolism of Modus Ponens seems to be an abstract exercise in redundancy. In the real world of gardening establishing the first premise, If p is true then q is true, would involve empirically checking all possible circumstances so that, if the premise did in fact turn out to be true in all cases, there is no point in building into the logical rule the possibility that it might be false. If there is light at the end of the tunnel implies all's well that ends well, is to be considered as a true premise, by the time we have checked all the tunnels for light and all the ends for wells, we will have a pretty fair idea as to the value of the premise as an integral part in a world knowledge model. The logic will have become an academic inconsequence.

Historically, it was probably assumed that the truth of the first implication premise of Modus Ponens could often be arrived at logically or synthetically. To pragmatic gardeners however, who have to find their facts by actually digging instead of generating them in a speculative armchair, such a process is simply unrealistic.